The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds by Fisch, Jill E.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1-2020 
The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds 
Jill E. Fisch 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, 
Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Social Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Fisch, Jill E., "The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds" (2020). Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law. 2139. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2139 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 101 
THE UNCERTAIN STEWARDSHIP POTENTIAL OF INDEX 
FUNDS 
JILL FISCH  
ABSTRACT 
  
 Regulators and commentators around the world are increasingly 
demanding that institutional investors engage in stewardship with respect to 
their portfolio companies.  Further, the demand for stewardship has broadened 
from an expectation that investors engage to reduce agency costs and promote 
economic value to a call for investors to demand that companies serve a broader 
range of societal interests and objectives.  This chapter considers calls for 
stewardship in the context of the U.S. capital markets specifically as applied to 
index funds. It argues that, irrespective of the merits of institutional stewardship 
generally, the structure of index funds and the business environment in which 
they operate limits their ability to engage in effective stewardship.  Although 
index fund sponsors have had a powerful influence on their portfolio companies, 
well-intentioned calls for them to play a more significant role and, in particular, 
claims that they should incorporate non-economic objectives more broadly into 
their engagement strategy, are in tension with the valuable role that index funds 
serve in the U.S. markets by providing a low-cost diversified investment option 
for an increasing segment of ordinary citizens. The chapter concludes by 
considering the possibility of using pass-through voting to enhance the 
stewardship potential of index funds.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Policymakers around the world are demanding that large institutional 
investors act as responsible stewards of their portfolio companies.1  The 
principal rationale behind the stewardship movement is that engaged 
institutional investors offer the potential to reduce managerial agency costs.2  
 
 Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and Co-
Director of the Institute for Law & Economics at the University of Pennsylvania 
School of Law.   
1 See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International 
Stewardship Codes’ (2018) 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497, 506–513 (describing global 
attention to stewardship following the UK’s creation of the world’s first 
stewardship code). 
2 See, e.g., Tim Bowley & Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Collective Activism and Shareholder 
Stewardship: The Australian Experience’ (this volume, draft at 1-2) (observing that 
UK stewardship code was adopted to address lack of shareholder participation in 
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Some commentators have also argued that institutional investors should go 
further and address broader societal concerns such as the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders and ESG considerations through their voting power, an 
pesrspective that has been formalized in the 2020 version of the U.K 
Stewardship Code.3   
 
 The challenge for the stewardship movement is that it treats institutional 
investors – primary large asset managers – as shareholders rather than 
intermediaries.  Both the structure and the business model of mutual funds limit 
their potential stewardship role in ways that stewardship advocates do not seem 
to appreciate fully.  Because of this, although the increasingly-concentrated 
institutional ownership of public corporations has substantially mitigated the 
agency problems identified by Berle and Means,4 institutional intermediaries 
cannot replicate the actions and incentives of true blockholders.5  As a result, 
commentators’ expectations about the potential value of investor stewardship 
may be unrealistic. 
 
 As this chapter explains, the asset management industry, which 
dominates institutional shareownership in the United States, faces two critical 
constraints.  First, its business model – and, in particular, the increasing flow of 
assets into low-cost passively-managed investment vehicles such as index funds 
and ETFs (collectively “index funds”) -- is not consistent with the kind of 
analysis necessary to provide substantial firm-specific oversight of corporate 
officers and directors of their portfolio companies on a cost-effective basis.  
Second, as the scope of the stewardship movement becomes more capacious, it 
calls for investors to make operational and governance choices, but the 
relationship between asset managers and fund beneficiaries provides a tenuous 
basis for making those choices.  
 
 Although commentators have called for mutual funds to devote greater 
resources to stewardship through more frequent engagement as well as the 
 
corporate governance and based on the view that greater engagement would 
operate “as a check on centralised managerial power”). 
3 See Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code 2020 (2020) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-
d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf, at 8, Principle 1 (advocating 
“stewardship that creates longterm value for clients and beneficiaries leading to 
sustainable benefits for the economy, the environment and society”). 
4 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1st ed. Macmillan 1932). 
5 See Alex Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, ‘Blockholders: A Survey of Theory 
and Evidence’ (2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820976 (identifying challenges in 
defining what level of ownership characterizes a blockholder and presenting data 
on large-block ownership in the United States). 
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increased use of shareholder proposals and even litigation,6 they have not 
reflected on the tension between the costs of that stewardship and the benefits 
that today’s mutual funds offer their beneficiaries by providing diversified 
investment vehicles at unprecedently low fees.7  Nor do they explain why it 
would be cost-effective for those who offer a low-cost financial product that 
does not require firm-specific investment analysis to invest resources to develop 
operational or governance expertise.  Indeed, even with respect to the broad-
based governance initiatives in which institutions have been actively engaged, 
there are questions about the extent to which the policies they advocate are 
consistent with enhancing firm value. 
 
 To address the concern that institutional investors may be poorly 
positioned to incorporate the economic and non-economic preferences of their 
beneficiaries into their stewardship or lack the authority to make those choices 
on behalf of those beneficiaries, several recent proposals have called for asset 
managers to determine those preferences by consulting with their beneficiaries.8  
For asset managers such as mutual funds, where direct consultation may be 
impractical, some commentators have called for pass-through voting.9  The 
limitations of these proposals highlight the difficulty inherent in developing a 
workable stewardship policy for an institutional intermediary, particularly a 
policy that incorporates non-economic considerations.   
 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Part I describes U.S. developments in 
response to the global stewardship movement and, in particular efforts to 
encourage institutional investors to engage with their portfolio companies as 
“good corporate stewards.”  Part II focuses on the specific case of the index fund, 
 
6 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, ‘Index Funds and the Future of 
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’ (2019) __ Colum. L. Rev. 
__ (forthcoming); Sean Griffith & Dorothy Lund, ‘Toward a Mission Statement for 
Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation’ (2019) __ U. Chi. L. Rev. __ 
(forthcoming). 
7 Research demonstrates that “the growth of explicitly indexed funds worldwide 
enhances competition in the asset management industry.” Martijn Cremers, Miguel 
A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos & Laura Starks ‘Indexing and Active Fund Management: 
International Evidence’ (forthcoming 2020) __ J. Fin. Econ __, 
https://www.darden.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/indexing-world-
2015-publication.pdf. 
8  See EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable 
European Economy (2018) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-
sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf 74 (“Pension funds should consult 
beneficiaries on their sustainability preferences and build those into their 
investment strategy.”).   
9 Caleb N. Griffin, ‘We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund 
Giants’ (2019) Md. L. Rev., 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365222. 
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offering a brief explanation of its structure and business model.  Part III explains 
why this business model is inconsistent with aggressive firm-specific 
stewardship – specifically a stewardship model that entails firm-specific 
monitoring of operational decisions.  Part IV considers the challenge presented 
by demands that index funds incorporate ESG and sustainability considerations 
into their stewardship efforts.  Finally Part V explores the distinctive nature of 
index fund beneficiaries -- the individuals who invest in index funds -- and the 
implications for proposals to empower those beneficiaries.  
 
  A cautionary note is in order.  This chapter focuses on the specific role 
of index funds and does not consider the extent to which the limitations 
identified herein are applicable to other types of institutional investors such as 
actively-managed mutual funds, hedge funds, banks, public pension funds and 
sovereign wealth funds.  Notably, the observations in this chapter are decidedly 
U.S.-centric and have more limited applicability to jurisdictions in which other 
types of instituitonal investors dominate.  The core observation of this chapter, 
however, is that institutional context matters.  Thus in considering the potential 
value of investor stewardship, policymakers would do well to reflect on the 
business model and structural details of the institutions that they seek to engage. 
 
I. INVESTOR STEWARDSHIP – THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE  
 
 As reflected in the 2010 version of the UK Stewardship Code, investor 
stewardship was initially intended to encourage institutional investors to respond 
to managerial agency problems – primarily excessive risk-taking and short-
termism.10  In the United States, stewardship reflected the potential ability of the 
reconcentration of ownership to address the classic Berle and Means problem of 
unchecked managerial power in the U.S. publicly-traded corporation.11  Berle 
and Means wrote at a time when the stock of U.S. public companies was held 
primarily by dispersed retail investors who lacked the incentive and expertise to 
monitor management and limit agency costs.  The rise of the institutional 
investor offered the possibility of reducing these agency costs.  
 
 Today institutional investors own approximately 70% of the stock of 
large U.S. public companies, and these holdings are concentrated in a handful of 
 
10 Financial Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code 2010, available at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-
Stewardship-Code.aspx. 
11 See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Corporate Governance Obsession,’ (2016) 
42 Iowa J. Corp. L. 359, 370-71 (describing Berke & Means’ identification of 
corporate governance problems as based, in part, on “unchecked managerial 
power”). 
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the largest institutions.12 In the United States, the largest institutional investors 
are asset management firms such as BlackRock, Vanguard, StateStreet, Charles 
Schwab and Fidelity, each of which manages trillions of dollars in assets.   
Collecively BlackRock, Vanguard and StateStreet (commonly known as the 
“Big Three”)13 “are together the largest owner in 88 percent of the S&P 500 [and 
are] the largest shareholder in 40 percent of listed firms in the U.S.”14 
 
 Despite the growing size of their holdings, for many years institutional 
investors in the United States were not actively engaged in corporate governance 
– they often did not vote their shares, they ignored the governance of their 
portfolio companies15 and they did not even seek to collect the damages 
available to them through shareholder litigation.16  Over the past thirty years, 
however, that situation has changed substantially.  Institutional investors have 
become increasingly active through a range of public and private engagement 
efforts, and corporations have responded to these efforts with governance 
structures that provide greater transparency and accountability.17  
 
 Even with the increasing involvement of institutional investors in 
corporate governance, the 2008 financial crisis caused a number of 
 
12 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, ‘Are Institutional Investors Part of the 
Problem or Part of the Solution?,’ (2011) 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-
center/80235_CED_WEB.pdf, at 4. 
13 See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, ‘Hidden 
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate 
Ownership, and New Financial Risk’ (2017) 19 Bᴜs. & Pᴏʟ. 298, 298, 304 
(explaining that BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street dominate the passive fund 
industry and terming them the “big three”). 
14 Bob Eccles, ‘Concentration In The Asset Management Industry: Implications 
For Corporate Engagement’ Forbes (17 April 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobeccles/2019/04/17/concentration-in-the-asset-
management-industry-implications-for-corporate-engagement/#bf13c44402f5 
15 See, e.g., Paul Rose, ‘The Corporate Governance Industry,’ (2007) 32 J. Corp. 
L. 887, 897 (“Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct 
research for less, or that more expensive but discerning research will enable it to 
obtain better returns (after subtracting its own research costs), the investor may be 
better off outsourcing its corporate governance research.”). 
16 James Cox & Randall Thomas, ‘Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional 
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?’ (2002) 80 Wash. U L Q 
855. 
17 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff, ‘The New Titans of 
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors’ (2020) U. Pa. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming) (detailing growth of engagement by institutional investors in 
corporate governance). 
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commentators to believe that investors were falling short.18  In the UK, this led 
the UK Financial Reporting Council to adopt the 2010 UK Stewardship Code, 
which is often described as “the world’s first stewardship code”19  The UK 
stewardship code, which has subsequently been refined,20 is the model for 
stewardship codes around the world.21  Commentators and regulators in many 
jurisdictions have embraced the idea that institutional investors have an 
obligation to engage in active stewardship of their portfolio companies and have 
identified a variety of potential benefits from stewardship.22  In April 2017, the 
European Union imposed a requirement, as part of its revised Shareholder Rights 
Directive, that institutional investors publicly disclose how they integrate 
shareholder engagement into their investment strategies or explain why they do 
not do so.23 
 
 U.S. regulators have not adopted a formal requirement of investor 
stewardship.  Certain components of what might be deemed a stewardship 
function are implicit, however, in other legal requirements that apply to 
institutional investors.  For example, both the courts and Congress have 
recognized that investment advisers owe fiduciary duties to the mutual funds 
they manage.24  In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted rules 
requiring mutual funds to develop voting policies and procedures as well as how 
 
18 Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?’ (2015) 
15 J. Corp. L. Stud. 217, 219 
19 Lee Roach, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’ (2011) 11 J. Corp. L. Stud. 463. 
20 Financial Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code,  
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-
Stewardship-Code-September2012.aspx; FRC, 2020 Stewardship Code, supra. 
21 See Simon Wong, ‘Is Institutional Investor Stewardship Still Elusive?’ (2015) 
Harv Law School Forum on Corp Gov & Fin. Reg., 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/24/is-institutional-investor-stewardship-
still-elusive-2/  (“Five years after the launch of the landmark UK Stewardship 
Code, counterparts can be found on four continents”). 
22 See Ernst & Young, ‘Q&A on Stewardship Codes’ (2017) 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-codes-august-
2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf (describing the proliferation of 
stewardship codes around the world and explaining that they “typically offer 
guidance to investors on how they should exercise their ownership and governance 
responsibilities, and how they should interact with the companies in which they 
invest”). 
23 Press Release, Eur. Comm., ‘Shareholders' rights directive Q&A’ (13 March, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_592 
24 Howard Schiffman, ‘The Relationship Between the Investment Advisor 
and the Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort’ (1976) 45 Ford L. Rev. 183, 183-84. 
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they voted their proxies at their portfolio companies.25  At the same time, the 
SEC adopted rules under the Investment Advisers Act requiring investment 
adviser to adopt policies to ensure that the funds' voting power is exercised in 
the "best interest" of the fund.26   
 
 Recently, a group of leading institutional investors in the United States,  
went further, forming the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG), a private group of 
institutional investors formed in 2017 for the purpose of establishing “the 
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance”27 According to its website, 
the ISG consists of 41 signatories and 24 additional “endorsers.” 28  The group 
includes some of the world’s largest asset managers and pension funds such as 
BlackRock, CalPERS, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Hermes and UBS.29 
 
 The ISG framework, a framwork that that Jennifer Hill calls an “investor-
led” stewardship code,30 sets out both “common expectations” regarding 
corporate governance practices of portfolio companies and “a set of fundamental 
stewardship responsibilities for institutional investors”31 In celebrating the one 
year anniversary of its release of the framework, the ISG touted its “remarkable 
success.”32  Yet whether the ISG framework will stimulate a meaningful change 
in the stewardship function of asset managers in the United States remains to be 
seen.  Notably, to date, although the signatories include several major asset 
managers, the number of signatories is limited.  A substantial component of the 
framework focuses on the governance of portfolio companies as opposed to the 
 
25 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
25922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566-67 (7 Feb. 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 
249, 270, 274) 
26 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
2106 (31 Jan. 2003), 68 FR 6585 (7 Feb. 2003). 
27 Investor Stewardship Group ‘About the Investor Stewardship Group and the 
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance’ https://isgframework.org/ 
accessed 25 Nov. 2019. 
28 Investor Stewardship Group ‘signatories’ https://isgframework.org/signatories-
and-endorsers/ accessed 25 Nov. 2019. 
29 Id. 
30 Hill, supra note 1 at 510-11. 
31 Investor Stewardship Group, ‘About the Investor Stewardship Group and the 
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance’ https://isgframework.org/. 
accessed 25 Nov. 2019. The ICG’s stewardship principles can be found here: 
https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/  
32 ‘Investor Stewardship Group Achieves Remarkable Success in its First Year’ 
Businesswire (18 Dec. 2018) 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181218005480/en/Investor-
Stewardship-Group-Achieves-Remarkable-Success-Year 
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stewardship activities of asset managers.  And the governance principles 
endorsed by the ISG do not appear to extend significantly beyond existing legal 
requirements or minimum standards.33  The stewardship principles are similarly 
limited.34 Although the ISG adopted the framework in the wake of criticisms by 
commentators that some U.S. instituional investors (and in particular, three of 
the ISG signatories – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) are devoting 
insufficient effort to governance and stewardship,35 the principles are not 
binding on either issuers or signatories.36  Indeed, the ISG website explicitly 
notes that signatories retain the discretion to “implement the stewardship 
principles in a manner they deem appropriate.”37 
 
 An additional concern about the ISG framework its failure to define  the 
objectives of investor stewardship explicitly or to designate the extent to which 
institutional investors can or should incorporate objectives other than wealth 
maximization into the stewardship function.38  Although a growing number of 
investors and policymakers are arguing that investor stewardship includes 
attention to non-shareholder stakeholders and social policy goals as well as 
economic value, and stewardship codes increasing reference these goals, they 
provide little guidance as to how a responsible steward is supposed to strike a 
balance between competing economic and non-economic objectives or between 
shareholders and other stakeholders.   
 
 These issues are highlighted in the case of passive investment vehicles 
such as index funds.  Although these investment vehicles hold title and exercise 
 
33 For example, Principle 1 states that “Boards are accountable to shareholders”, a 
principle that is reflected in existing statutory and common law principles such as 
fiduciary duties and the power of shareholder to elect and remove directors.   
34 Principle A of the Stewardship Framework, for example, states that 
“Institutional investors are accountable to those whose money they invest,” a 
principle that is inherent in the legal status of asset managers and other institutional 
investors as fiduciaries.  
35 See, e.g. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6, working paper at 11 (identifying the 
“the shortcomings of current stewardship decisions” by index funds); Dorothy 
Lund ‘The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting’ (2018) 43 Iowa J. Corp. L. 
493, 497(“passive funds have failed to act as seriously engaged owners”). 
36 In describing the ISG, Hill observes that “The Walker Review’s clear message 
was that regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned codes have more clout than investor-
led codes.” Hill, supra note 1 at 510. 
37 ISG, About the Investor Stewardship Group, supra note 31. 
38 See Bernard S. Sharfman, ‘The First Critique of the “Framework for U.S. 
Stewardship and Governance”’ (2017) https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2017/11/first-critique-framework-us-stewardship-and-governance 
(arguing that “as stewards, the objective of such management must be wealth 
maximization.”). 
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voting rights with respect to an increasing percentage of global equity and are 
particularly important for their growing ownership of the U.S. equity markets, 
their distinctive structure and business model provide practical limitations on 
their potential effectiveness as corporate stewards.  The risk of imposing 
extensive stewardship obligations on index funds is that it may have the 
consequence of reducing the viability of index funds as an investment tool for 
unsophisticated retail investors, creating demands for managerial decisions that 
constrain efficient corporate decision-making, or introducing additional agency 
costs.  As a result, this chapter suggests caution in effort to expand institutional 
investor stewardship obligations. 
 
II. THE BUSINESS MODEL OF INDEX FUNDS 
 
 This chapter focuses on a particular segment of the institutional investor 
market – index funds. Index funds are a type of mutual fund, an investment 
vehicle that consists of a pool of assets managed by an investment adviser 
pursuant to an advisory agreement.  In the case of an index fund, the advisory 
services provided are minimal because the fund’s investment strategy is simply 
to track the return of a designated index such as the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average or the S&P 500.39  There are thousands of potential indexes, but the 
majority of assets are invested in funds that track the most popular indexes.40  
Thus, for example, the DIA ETF, which is offered by State Street Asset 
management, seeks to provide investment returns that track those of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, and currently consists of approximately $22 trillion in 
assets under management.41   
 
 Estimates vary as to the precise percentage of equity held by index funds; 
one estimate from 2017 indicated that index funds hold approximately 18% of 
the global stock market.42  That number continues to grow. Within the mutual 
fund industry, funds that passively track an index will, if current trends continue, 
 
39 For a more complete discussion of the structure of index funds, see Fisch, et al., 
supra note 17. 
40 For a comprehensive explanation of the creation and structure of indexes and 
index funds see Adriana Z. Robertson, ‘Passive in Name Only: Delegated 
Management and “Index” Investing’ (2019) 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795. 
41 State Street Global Advisors, SPDR® Dow Jones® Industrial Average ETF 
Trust, https://us.spdrs.com/en/etf/spdr-dow-jones-industrial-average-etf-trust-DIA 
accessed 25 Nov. 2019. 
42 Trevor Hunnicutt, ‘Less than 18 percent of global stocks owned by index 
investors: BlackRock’ (3 Oct. 2017) Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
funds-blackrock-passive/less-than-18-percent-of-global-stocks-owned-by-index-
investors-blackrock-idUSKCN1C82TE 
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top 50% of U.S. stock funds within 2019.43 Moreover, with the growth of passive 
investing, the mutual fund industry has experienced substantial concentration 
such that most mutual fund assets are invested by the top 3 or 4 mutual fund 
companies.  In turn, BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity collectively 
own as much as 15 or 20% of the large public companies.44   
 
 Two aspects of the index fund model are particularly relevant in 
evaluating their potential to engage in effective stewardship.  The first is that, 
because the investment model of index funds is passively to track an index, the 
advisers of the fund have no reason to engage in firm-specific research and 
analysis to informm their investment decisions.  In contrast to active managers, 
hedge funds and other stock pickers, index funds do not, indeed they cannot, 
trade on the basis of information.  Rather than the potential opportunity to beat 
some designated benchmark, index funds offer their investors a market rate of 
return.  Because they are designed to replicate the returns of what is typically a 
broad-based index, these funds also offer their investors substantial 
diversification.    
 
 The second aspect of the index fund model that is relevant to its potential 
for effective stewardship is its fee structure.  Because they do not rely on costly 
firm-specific research, index funds incur lower management costs, and they pass 
these reduced costs on to mutual fund investors in the form of very low fees.  
Because funds that track the same index will, if properly designed, produce near-
identical returns, a fund sponsor cannot distinguish itself in terms of the skill of 
its advisers.  Nor can a sponsor charge a premium for adviser quality.  The result 
is that the fees charged by index funds to investors are very low and substantially 
lower than those of actively-managed funds.  Indeed, in 2018, Fidelity 
introduced four no-fee index funds.45  The combination of low cost and 
diversification makes index funds a popular tool for retirement accounts, and a 
substantial proportion of the assets under management in index funds are 
retirement savings, a subject to which this chapter will return in Part V below. 
 
III. PASSIVE INVESTORS AND FIRM OVERSIGHT 
 
 
43 Charles Stein, ‘Shift from Active to Passive Approaches Tipping Point in 2019, 
[2018] Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-31/shift-
from-active-to-passive-approaches-tipping-point-in-2019 
44 See Fichtner, et al., supra note 13, at 298, 304 (presenting data on size and 
holdings of the largest US asset managers and showing that BlackRock, Vanguard, 
State Street and Fidelity were the four largest as of June 2016). 
45 Eric Rosenbaum, ‘Who won the zero-fee ETF war? It looks like no one’ CNBC 
(10 Oct. 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/who-won-the-zero-fee-etf-war-
it-looks-like-no-one.html (reporting that Fidelity “launched four core index mutual 
funds at no fee,”). 
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 As the preceding discussion explains, neither index funds nor the 
investment advisers who manage them necessarily acquire any firm-specific 
information about their portfolio companies in connection with the decision to 
invest in those companies.  Unlike the prototypical rational investor which 
evaluates the information available in the market in order to make an informed 
investment decision, index fund advisers mechanically cause the fund to invest 
in the securities necessary to match the return of the designated index.  While 
the fund buys and sells securities on a regular basis – to meet purchase and 
redemption requests, to rebalance as necessary and to adjust to changes in the 
underlying index – those transactions are mechanical and non-discretionary.   
 
 The irrelevance of information to index fund trading makes index funds 
an anomaly with respect to federal securities regulation which creates a 
disclosure regime designed to enable investors to make informed trading 
decisions.  Indeed, the threshold criterion for defining securities disclosure 
obligations is the concept of materiality which is defined as information such 
that there is a “substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in making an investment decision.”46  From the perspective 
of an index fund, the disclosures made by its portfolio companies are arguably 
irrelevant, at least with respect to the fund’s investment decisions.  
 
 Index fund sponsors would, of course, challenge the claim that they do 
not use or benefit from corporate disclosures.  They use disclosures to make 
informed voting decisions, and, increasingly, they engage with their portfolio 
companies in an effort to improve their corporate governance, risk management 
and economic success.47  Although commentators disagree as to whether passive 
funds exert sufficient effort with respect to these initiatives and whether their 
efforts lead to improved firm performance, there is little question that index fund 
sponsors and advisers are devoting increasing resources to stewardship.  Indeed, 
the call for increased stewardship – from both academics and policymakers – is 
premised on the expectation that those efforts should be increased. 
 
 Some academics question whether those demands are cost effective.48  
Specifically, for stewardship to have a meaningful impact on a firm-specific 
 
46 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
47 Voting levels have increased.  Index funds are likely to be at least as effective as 
many other types of shareholders such as retail investors and algorithmic traders at 
rationally voting their shares.   In most cases, the level of firm-specific information 
necessary to make an informed voting decision is relatively limited. 
48 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, ‘Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate 
Governance’ (2019) 71 Stan. L. Rev. 687, 696 (arguing that index funds should not 
vote in corporate elections because it is not cost-effective for them to incur 
expenditures to monitor their portfolio companies). 
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basis – by reducing managerial agency costs, improving operational decision-
making or modifying firm structure --  investors require firm-specific 
information to identify existing deficiencies and to evaluate, within the context 
of the firm’s operations, appropriate changes to address those deficiencies.  In 
addition to acquiring information, investors must develop the necessary 
expertise to evaluate that information such that their challenges are reliable.49  
As Ron Gilson explained: “for investors, distinguishing between shortsighted 
and well-disciplined managements—and between farsighted companies and 
those for whom the payoff will never materialize—is often impossible.”50 
 
 Firm-specific engagement aimed at disciplining management or 
identifying value-enhancing structural or operational changes exists in today’s 
markets; indeed, it is precisely the business model of the activist hedge fund.  
Hedge funds invest in portfolio companies with the plan of evaluating firm-
specific information and proposing structural or operational changes designed 
to improve firm performance.  Although commentators debate the extent to 
which hedge fund activism contributes to sustainable economic value as 
opposed to relying on short term strategies that conflict with the interests of 
long-term holders,51 hedge funds may be, may be considered high-powered 
investor stewards.52  
  
 Although one can debate whether hedge fund activism is fairly 
categorized as stewardship, at least when stewardship is focused on maximizing 
economic value and reducing agency costs, the debate is largely semantic.53  
 
49 Some actively managed firms are going on the offensive. Schroders published a 
report in September 2018 saying passively managed funds lacked the resources for 
reliable research on whether companies live up to ESG standards. The report said 
these lower-cost funds lack the “specialist knowledge” needed to lobby the boards 
of portfolio companies for ESG changes.  Schroders, ‘ESG in passive: let the buyer 
beware’ [2018] https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/esg-in-passive-
let-the-buyer-beware/.  “There doesn’t appear to be a cheap way to get real 
sustainability,” said Jessica Ground, the global head of stewardship at Schroders.  
Id.   
50 Ronald Gilson, ‘Legal and Political Challenges to Corporate Purpose’ (2019) 31 
J. App. Corp. Fin 1, 9 
51 See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder 
Stewardship: Incompatible, Reciprocal or Something in Between?’ (forthcoming) 
(citing empirical debate over the effect of hedge fund activism on the long term 
value of portfolio companies). 
52 See, e.g., id. (evaluating activism by UK hedge funds within stewardship 
framework); Jill E. Fisch & Simone Sepe ‘Shareholder Collaboration’ 
(forthcoming 2020) __ Tex. L. Rev. __ (describing collaborative role of hedge 
funds). 
53 This chapter considers the question of whether stewardship should ecompass 
non-economic or non-shareholder objectives below.   
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What makes it feasible for hedge funds to engage in effective stewardship?  
Three factors are key.  First, hedge funds invest in a limited number of portfolio 
companies and take a substantial economic position in each.  As a result, a hedge 
fund has the potential to receive a substantial benefit from its engagement, both 
in absolute terms and as a proportion of the overall value of the fund.  For 
example, hedge fund Trian Partners invested $3.5 billion of its $12.7 billion fund 
in Proctor & Gamble.54  The hedge fund’s lack of diversification also minimizes 
the free rider effect – although other shareholders in the target company may 
benefit from the activism, they will not benefit to the same degree as the hedge 
fund.55  Second, hedge funds can devote substantial resources to gathering the 
type of firm-specific information necessary to engage in effective stewardship.56  
The standard hedge fund fee structure pays the fund advisers 2% of assets under 
management and 20% of profits, making it cost-effective for substantial 
activism-based expenditures.57  Third, hedge funds have specialized knowledge.  
They hire managers and employees that can offer firm and industry expertise.58 
 
 All three of these features are absent from the index fund business model.  
Index funds offer broad diversification; the very point of an index fund is to 
provide its investors with broad market exposure rather than a selected small 
group of stocks.  Index funds offer their investors very low fees; in fact, the 
market appeal of the index fund is its potential to charge less than actively-
managed funds.  Finally, given that index funds do not engage in information-
based investment decisions, they derive limited value from paying to develop 
firm or industry expertise.  As a result, there is a substantial risk that index funds 
 
54 Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Billionaire Nelson Peltz: P&G is making my board battle 
the “dumbest thing I’ve ever been involved in”’  (6 Oct. 2017) CNBC.com 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/06/billionaire-activist-peltz-my-proxy-fight-with-
procter-gamble-will-be-close.html 
55 This distinguishes hedge funds from mutual funds.  See, e.g., Lund, supra note 
48  (identifying the free rider concern as a limit on index fund engagement). 
56 See, e.g., Zsolt Katona, Marcus Painter, Panos Patatoukas & Jean Zeng ‘On the 
Capital Market Consequences of Alternative Data: Evidence from Outer Space’ 
(July 30, 2018). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222741 (describing persistent above-
market returns that hedge funds can obtain through their purchase and use of costly 
satellite data of store parking lots). 
57 For example, Trian spent an estimated $25 million in its proxy fight with Proctor 
& Gamble.  Barrett J. Brunsman ‘P&G expects proxy battle to cost $35 million’ (2 
Aug. 2017) Cincinnati Business Courier 
https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2017/08/02/p-g-expects-proxy-
battle-to-cost-35-million.html 
58 See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., ‘The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The 
Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise’ (2016) 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 
(providing empirical evidence that successful activists bring expertise to their 
engagements). 
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will impose what Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire term “principal competence 
costs” – “mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent.”59 
 
 Concededly index funds can, and increasingly do, engage in some level 
of stewardship that is cost-effective within their existing business model.60 They 
can develop expertise with respect to corporate governance issues that affect a 
substantial proportion of companies in their portfolios. They can identify and 
evaluate market-wide trends and risks such as climate change and cybersecurity 
and can call upon those companies that lag to adopt the best practices of industry 
leaders.61  
 
 Notably, even this level of engagement may present challenges.62  For 
example, although it seems uncontroversial to call for index funds to demand 
better governance from their portfolio companies, experts often disagree both on 
what constitutes good governance and on the relationship of specific governance 
features to firm economic value.  Thus, while index funds have championed 
director independence, and institutional investor pressure has led issuers to 
boards that are almost entirely independent of management, empirical evidence 
has failed to establish a connection between board independence and firm 
economic value.63  Similarly, index funds were among the investors who, 
through the Harvard shareholder rights project, sought to persuade their portfolio 
companies to eliminate their staggered boards.64  Yet the empirical evidence on 
the impact of staggered boards is mixed, and research suggests that staggered 
 
59 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, ‘Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate 
Law and Governance’ (2017) 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 770. 
60 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the potential that index funds, or 
mutual funds generally, will limit their stewardship out of a desire to further other 
business relationships with their portfolio companies such as the opportunity to 
manage their 401(k) plans.  See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business 
Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. Fin. Econ. 552, 553 (2007) (noting 
the argument that mutual funds that manage corporate pension plans may be more 
"acquiescent to existing governance practices"). 
61 See Fisch, et al., supra note 17 (describing engagement efforts by the large 
index fund providers). 
62 See Alicia Davis, ‘The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate 
Governance”’ (2015) Columbia Business Law Review 11-12 (finding that 
institutional investors mistakenly believe high-quality internal governance devices 
to be value-enhancing). 
63 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, ‘The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance’ (1999) 54 Bus. Law. 921, 924, 933. 
64 Daniel Gallagher and Joseph Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities 
Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors (Rock Center for 
Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 199, Dec. 4, 
2014), available at https://bit.ly/2IE1bEu. 
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boards can be value-enhancing in some cases.65  It is well known that 
institutional investors were a leading force in the shift to making executive pay 
structures more performance-based, but stock options, a popular feature of early 
performance-based structures, turned out to have create problematic incentives 
for executives to take excessive risk.66  Most recently, index funds have been 
vocal opponents of dual class stock structures, and the Council of Institutional 
Investors has urged exchanges and regulators to ban or limit dual class.67  Again, 
however, the empirical data fails to support the claim that dual class stock 
reduces firm value.68   
 
 One problem with broad-based governance initiatives is the possibility 
that the effect of governance is firm-specific and that, as a result, determining 
whether a governance reform will enhance value at a particular company 
requires firm-specific knowledge.69  This in turn, increases the cost of effective 
stewardship.  To the extent that one cannot reliably ascertain the economic 
impact of particular governance models or structures, either in general or with 
respect to individual firms, it may be rational for index funds to adopt a 
diversified market-wide approach to governance.   
 
 Assuredly index funds could devote greater resources to stewardship to 
address these concerns.  Index funds could sponsor shareholder proposals, serve 
as lead plaintiffs in shareholder litigation and meet with officers and directors at 
a greater percentage of their portfolio companies.  Index funds could hire 
investment advisers with firm and industry expertise and pay those advisers to 
devote more hours to acquiring and evaluating firm-specific information.  But 
 
65 Id.; Cremers & Simone Sepe, ‘The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards’ 
(2016) 68 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 71-72. 
66 See, e.g., Zhiyong Dong et al., ‘Do Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive 
Risk Taking?’ (2010) 34 J. BANK. & FIN. 2518, 3-16 (discussing whether 
executive stock options induce excessive risk taking by managers). 
67 See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, ‘CII Welcomes S&P Dow Jones’ 
Decision to Ban New Multi-Class Companies from Key Stock Indexes’ (2017) 
https://www.cii.org/spdjmulticlassban (explaining that “The Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII) welcomes S&P Dow Jones’ decision to ban new multi-
class companies from its key U.S. stock indexes”) 
68 See George David Banks & Bernard Sharfman, ‘Standing Up for the Retail 
Investor’ (2018), Harv. Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Financial Regulation, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/10/standing-up-for-
the-retail-investor/ (criticizing institutions for advocating the elimination of dual 
class stock despite the economic success of companies like Google, Facebook and 
Berkshire Hathaway.  
69 See, e.g, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash’ 
(2016) 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 649, 697 (providing empirical evidence supporting “the 
proposition that corporate governance should be decided on a firm-by-firm basis”). 
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these efforts are costly.  While index fund providers could potentiallly 
distinguish themselves on the basis of their stewardship activities and thereby 
justify charging higher fees, it is unclear at present whether investors will be 
willing to pay a premium to invest in funds that engage in greater stewardship.  
Even if they are, it is unclear whether index funds are the most efficient providers 
of firm-specific monitoring.   
 
IV. INDEX FUNDS AND STEWARDSHIP OBJECTIVES 
 
 Determining the appropriate objectives of investor stewardship adds an 
additional complication.  The original UK Stewardship code did not definte 
stewardship or its objectives.70  That omission has been remedied, and today, in 
both the UK and the EU, most calls for institutional investor stewardship do not 
restrict themselves to encouraging investors to seek to enhance the economic 
value of their portfolio companies but instead urge a broader focus on non-
shareholder stakeholders or the public interest.71  This broader focus is reflected 
in the 2020 UK Code, which adopts a definition of “stewardship that creates 
longterm value for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for 
the economy, the environment and society.”72 
 
 This mandate complicates the decision-making framework for funds and 
their advisers as well as placing additional demands on fund expertise.  How are 
funds and their managers to determine which societal values warrant attention?  
How are fund decisionmakers to weigh the potentially competing interests of the 
customers, suppliers, employees and communities affected by the operations of 
their portfolio companies and to balance those interests against shareholder 
economic value?73  Although increasing the sustainability of a firm’s operations 
 
70 Reisberg, supra note __. 
71 See Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Shareholder stewardship: a case of (re)-embedding 
the institutional investors and the corporation?’ (“Outside the USA, the currently 
prevailing narrative, especially in policy circles, views shareholder engagement as 
a desirable corporate governance attribute able not only to improve corporate 
governance and performance, but also to ensure long-term stability and social 
responsibility”) 
72 2020 Stewardship Code at 8, Principle 1.  The Code goes on to explain that 
“Signatories systematically integrate stewardship and investment, including 
material environmental, social and governance issues, and climate change, to fulfil 
their responsibilities.”  Id. at 15, Principle 7. 
73 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ‘In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’ 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 
1436 (explaining that this role is analogous to the untenuous competing duties 
imposed on a “lawyer for the situation”). 
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may enhance firm economic value, there are reasons to reasons to question the 
consistent alignment of societal objectives with profit maximization.74 
 
 Stewardship addressed to a broader range of objectives also exacerbates 
the agency problem faced by index funds and their advisers as intermediaries for 
investors in the funds.  The problem posed is similar to the one debated eighty 
years ago between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd.  Dodd argued broadly that 
corporate managers had a responsibility to operate their businesses in the 
interests of the general public.75  Berle responded, not out of an opposition to 
the general idea that corporations should have a public responsibility but to a 
broad view of managerial discretion that would leave it unconstrained.76  
Investor stewardship raises similar concerns.  If advisers use fund engagement 
to maximize the fund’s economic value, investors in that fund have metrics to 
evaluate whether that engagement is successful and cost-justified.  At the 
present, however, the metrics for evaluating the social responsibility of a 
portfolio company or a socially responsible investment fund are problematic – 
as many commentators have observed, sustainability disclosures are limited, 
incomplete and largely unreliable.77 
 
 Obligating investment managers to incorporate broad-based stewardship 
objectives also increases the risk of self-dealing.78  As with corporate 
 
74 See Leo E. Strine, Jr. ‘Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-profit 
Corporations Seek Profit’ [2012] 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 135 (“the cost, 
simplistic, and single-minded, short-term focus of stockholders on stock price may 
result in outcomes that, from a broader societal perspective, are deeply 
uncomfortable.”) 
75 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1148 (arguing that corporations that corporations have a 
“social service [responsibility] as well as a profit-making function.”). 
76 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, ‘Shareholder Primacy's 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation,’ (2008) 34 Iowa J. 
Corp. L. 99, 129 (explaining that “To make managers trustees for the community 
would free them of any meaningful constraint because almost all corporate activity 
could be justified in the interests of one group or another.”). 
77 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, ‘Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable’ (2019) 
107 Geo. L. J. 924, 926 (critically observing that sustainability disclosures are 
neither standardized nor audited and that issuers vary substantially in the 
information they provide); Jon Sindreu & Sarah Kent, ‘Why It's So Hard to Be an 
'Ethical' Investor’ (1 Sept. 2018) Wall St. J.  https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-its-
so-hard-to-be-an-ethical-investor-1535799601?mod=?mod=itp&mod=djemITP_h 
[https://perma.cc/K7EH-EBUG]. (observing that “A Journal analysis of four 
leading ESG ratings providers found that they come to completely different 
conclusions about what makes a company a “sustainable” investment.”). 
78 As Leo Strine observes, although Henry Ford defended his decision not to pay 
corporate dividends as improving social welfare, “Ford’s desire to deny [the Dodge 
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managers,79 the heads of institutional intermediaries may “use other people’s 
money to advance their own view of the good.”80  There is little reason to think 
that fund managers have particular expertise in identifying the most appropriate 
social goals, and there is a realistic possibility that the goals they advocate may 
instead be controversial or unique.81  At the same time, the substantial voting 
power exercised by the large mutual fund companies gives leaders like Larry 
Fink at BlackRock a “bully pulpit”82 to take public positions that cause some to 
acclaim him as a “visionary”83 despite the fact that, if the principles he advocates 
sacrifice economic value, it is the customers in BlackRock’s funds who will bear 
the cost. 
 
 Asset managers also face competing incentives.  Advocating social 
responsibility may help asset management firms resist regulatory interventions 
motived by fears of their growing power.  A firm that is publicly associated with 
social responsibility may be more attractive to an employer as the administrator 
of company 401(k) plans.  A mutual fund company may favor social policies at 
their portfolio companies that sacrifice returns to attract discretionary 
investments by some investors even if other investors prefer decisions motivated 
exclusively by economics.  A critical component of the trade-off among 
investors is that mutual funds manage a substantial quantity of retirement 
investments, many of which are owned by unsophisticated employees who are 
defaulted into their employer’s choice of 40!(k) investment option and face the 
real prospect of having inadequate retirement savings if the economic returns of 
their investments are not maximized. 
 
  In addition, there are reasons to believe that even well-intentioned and 
unconflicted asset managers may be imperfect proxies for the interests of their 
beneficiaries.  Scholars have identified significant differences between the 
 
Brothers] dividends that could be used to fund their own eponymous car 
manufacturing operations might have also contributed to Henry Ford’s high-
mindedness.”  Strine, supra note 74, n. 32 
79 As Stephen Bainbridge observes "The real object and purpose of a corporation 
for profit is to make a profit and to make dividends for the stockholders, and a 
person who holds the stock of a company has a right to have the business of the 
company conducted, as far as practicable at least, so that it will make profits and 
pay dividends." Steven Bainbridge, A Predecessor to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
(2019) https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2019/07/a-
predecssor-to-dodge-v-ford-motor-co.html citing Arbuckle v. Woolson Spice Co., 
1901 WL 708, at *2 (Ohio Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1901). 
80 Strine, supra note 74. 
81 Id. 




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355 
  
2019]  119 
 
voting preferences of retail and institutional investors on a variety of issues from 
election of directors and executive compensation to support for shareholder 
proposals.84  Particularly worrisome in this regard is the fact that one of the 
largest gaps is with respect to sustainability and ESG issues. As one study 
reported, environmental and social proposals were supported by 29 percent of 
institutional investors but only 16 percent of retail investors.85     
 
 Although retail voting patterns suggest that mutual fund voting currently 
favors ESG issues more than the voting of retail investors, 86 some commentators 
assert that investors will sacrifice return in favor of principles.87  Recent asset 
flows support this, finding increasing investor demand for ESG-conscious index 
funds even though the cost of such funds is significantly higher than other index 
funds. To the extent that fund beneficiaries are willing to pay for fund 
stewardship, the prospect of more effective index fund stewardship increases 
dramatically. On the other hand, studies also suggest that retail investors do not 
support their asset managers sacrificing returns in favor of social policy 
initiatives.88  One possibility is to retain the low costs of an index-based 
 
84 Ning Chiu, ‘How Do Retail Shareholders Vote?’ [2018] Davis Polk, Briefing: 
Governance https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2018/10/how-do-retail-
shareholders-vote/ (finding substantial greater support by institutional investors for 
social and environmental proposals than by retail investors); Gretchen Morgenson, 
‘Small Investors Support the Boards. But Few of Them Vote.’ [2017[ New York 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/small-investors.html  
(reporting on an analysis of shareholder voting that found “a striking contrast 
between the views of institutional investors and those of individuals”) 
85 Main Street Investors Coalition, ‘Proxy Advisor Recommendations Ignore the 
Views of Retail Investors’ [2018[ https://mainstreetinvestors.org/proxy-advisor-
recommendations-ignore-the-views-of-retail-investors/ 
86 Some reports nonetheless criticize mutual funds, particularly ESG funds, for 
voting records that do not show greater support for ESG proposals.  See, e.g., 
Lewis Braham, Sustainability Ratings Tell Half the Story’ [2017] Barron’s, 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sustainability-ratings-tell-half-the-story-
1507350027/ Unfortunately because most analyzes of fund voting evaluate 
proposals by category rather than the substance of the proposal, they risk 
presenting a misleading picture of fund voting policies.  See, e.g., Fund Votes, 
https://www.fundvotes.com/votingtrends/.  Thus, for example, Fund Votes’ 
presentation of voting data on environmental, social and governance proposals 
seems to assume that an ESG-oriented fund would properly support 100% of 
shareholder proposals on those topics irrespective of their content. 
87 See Gilson, supra note __ at 12  (predicting they will) 
88 See Main Street Investors Coalition, supra note __. In an analogous survey of 
pension fund beneficiaries “86% of CalPERS members and 79% within NYC 
Funds indicated their pension fund should be focused on generating returns and 
shouldn’t be making investment decisions on the basis of politics even if they 
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investment strategy while committing the fund to a more ESG-oriented voting 
policy.89  Indeed, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) offers a specialty set 
of socially responsible investment voting guidelines.90   Although such a fund’s 
voting approach must be relatively inflexible to limit costs,91 the approach offers 
mutual fund customers a cost-effective way of increasing the social orientation 
of their investments.  Notably, however, it does so by transfering the task of 
determining appropriate social policy from asset managers to ISS, a delegation 
that has been criticized in other contexts.92 
 
V. THE ROLE OF FUND BENEFICIARIES 
 
 One possible solution to the agency problem is empowering mutual fund 
beneficiaries to determine or oversee the stewardship objectives of their asset 
managers.  This could be done at the entity level through shareholder voting on 
or approval of fund stewardship policies or at the beneficiary level through the 
implementation of pass-through voting. This section questions the efficacy of 
either approach. 
 
 As early as the 1970s, the SEC expressed concern about the growing 
institutionalization of the public equity markets and the effect of that 
institutionalization on proxy voting.93 Among its concerns was the fact that 
 
support the idea or cause.”  Spectrem Group, ‘Tensions with Pensions: An 
Analysis of Public Pension Fund Members’ Knowledge and 
Sentiment about How Their Money Is Being Invested’ [2018] 
89 Gina Rao has made such a proposal.  See Gina Rao, ‘Give mutual fund investors 
a voice in shareholder proxy voting’ (2017) MarketWatch, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/give-mutual-fund-investors-a-voice-in-
shareholder-proxy-voting-2017-12-12 (advocating an index fund that commits in 
its prospectus to follow an ESG voting policy). 
90 See Institutional Shareholder Services, ‘United States SRI Proxy Voting 
Guidelines 2019 Policy Recommendations’ (2019) 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/specialty/SRI-US-Voting-
Guidelines.pdf 
91 See Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, ‘Proxy Advisory Firms: 
The Economics of Selling Information to Voters’ (2019) 5 J. Fin. 2441 (noting the 
“one-size fits all” criticism of proxy advisor recommendations). 
92 See, e.g., David Larcker & Allan McCall, ‘Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to 
Proxy Advisory Firms’ (2015) 58 J.L. & Econ. 173, 203 ("The outsourcing of 
voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have the unintended economic 
consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease 
shareholder value."). 
93 See Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder 
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance 
Generally, (1978) Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14970, 1978 SEC LEXIS 
1127, *31 (noting that, “major institutions held, as at the end of 1977, more than 
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institutional voting might not reflect the views of those with the true economic 
interest in the shares.  In 1978, the SEC explicitly considered the desirability of 
obtaining these views “by means of a polling or pass-through voting 
requirement.”94  At that time, the SEC reported that “substantially all of the 
commentators who addressed the issue  . . . were opposed to such a requirement” 
citing suggestions that the undertaking would be costly and difficult and that 
fund shareholders were unlikely to have an interest in or desire to vote on the 
issues affecting their portfolio companies.95   
 
 Subsequent technological developments have reduced the cost and 
difficulty of pass-through voting. Leading to to renewed calls for pass-through 
voting.96  For example, Jennifer Taub has argued that pass-through voting would 
enable fund beneficiaries to overcome the passivity of fund advisers.97  Dorothy 
Lund argues that pass-through voting would reduce the “incidence of 
uninformed voting.”98  Caleb Griffin suggests that mutual funds could use 
standing voting instructions to democratize index fund voting either by enabling 
fund beneficiaries to complete an issue-based survey that would form the basis 
for the beneficiary’s proxy voting guidelines or by stipulating in advance that 
their votes should mirror those of a proxy advisor or another institutional 
investor.99 
 
 These commentators accurately highlight the potential for pass-through 
voting to reduce agency costs, and technological advances such as internet 
 
33% of the total stock outstanding in the United States.). Ironically, the number 
today is closer to 70%).   
94 Id., 1978 SEC LEXIS 1127, *33-34 
95 Id. 
96 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet 
on Modern Securities Regulation’ (1997) 52 Bus. Law. 1195, 1210-13 (observing 
that “on the longer-term horizon, there is even the visionary possibility that the 
Internet can be used to pass through voting rights in securities held by pension and 
mutual funds to the fund's own owners or beneficiaries”); John C. Wilcox, 
Electronic Communication and Proxy Voting: The Governance Implications of 
Shareholders in Cyberspace’ [1997] Insights 8, 11 (discussing company 
communications with investors through new electronic media and wondering 
whether "pass-through voting" for investors in pension funds and mutual funds will 
develop).  Indeed, there has been some development of pass-through voting in 
pension plans.  James A. Fanto, ‘Investor Education, Securities Disclosure, and the 
Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm Norms’ (1998) 48 
Cath. U.L. Rev. 15, 35. N. 79 (observing that “pass-through voting has developed 
within both defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans”) 
97 Jennifer S. Taub ‘Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to 
Advocate for Shareholders' Rights’ (2009) 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 888-89  
98 Lund, supra note __ at 530. 
99 Griffin, supra note __. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355 
  
122 FISCH CHAPTER [Vol. 99:ppp 
 
voting make pass-through substantially less difficult to implement than it was in 
the 1970s.  The fact remains, however, that mutual fund investors are poorly 
positioned to direct the proxy voting of their proportionate interest in the fund’s 
portfolio companies. Addressing the complex questions necessary to formulate 
an effective stewardship policy are even harder. 
 
 In understanding this point, it is important to keep the characteristics of 
retail mutual fund investors in mind.  In 2018, individual investors held 89% of 
mutual fund assets.  Mutual fund investors differ from other retail investors.  
They select their mutual funds, in the best case scenario on the basis of 
investment style and cost and, in the worst case, on the basis of less rational 
criteria such as the name of the fund.  Typically they do not engage in firm-
specific research into the portfolio companies held by the mutual funds in which 
they invest; indeed, in most cases they are unlikely to know the portfolio 
companies in which the mutual fund is invested.  Their very purpose, in choosing 
a mutual fund, is to delegate investment discretion to the fund manager.   
 
  Further, retail investors hold a substantial percentage of their mutual fund 
investments in retirement accounts that have distinctive characteristics.  In 2018, 
94% of mutual fund investors held their funds inside employer-sponsored 
retirement plans, IRAs and variable annuities.100  37% of households held 
mutual funds exclusively through employer-sponsored retirement plans and, in 
many cases assets held outside such plans were the result of 401(k) rollovers.101  
The purchase of a mutual fund in a 401(k) is different from a market-based 
investment decision.  Although plan participants choose the specific funds in 
which they invest, that choice is limited by the menu of investment options 
selected by the employer.  In addition, an increasing number of employers enroll 
their employees into their retirement plans automatically.102 The money of those 
employees is invested in a default option designated by the employer unless the 
employee chooses an alternative.  Default options are commonly index funds or 
target date funds that include one or more index funds.   
 
 In addition, employee-investors are distinctive.  Recent empirical 
research suggests that people who invest exclusively through 401(k) plans have 
very low levels of financial literacy – lower in fact than other investors.103  One 
 
100 ICI Fact Book 2019 at 136. 142 
101 Id. at 142. 
102 See, e.g., Bob Pisani, ‘America’s retirement accounts are growing, but not fast 
enough’ (2018) CNBC https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/12/americas-retirement-
accounts-are-growing-but-not-fast-enough.html (reporting that “At year-end 2018, 
48% of Vanguard plans had adopted automatic enrollment and 66% of new plan 
entrants were signed up that way.”). 
103 See Jill Fisch, Annamaria Lusardi & Andrea Hasler ‘Defined Contribution 
Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy (forthcoming 2019) Cornell Law 
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study reports that “only slightly more than one third (37 percent) of workplace-
only investors have some basic financial knowledge as measured by the Big 
Three, and only 35 percent can answer the question about compound interest 
correctly.”104   
 
 Concededly setting priorities with respect to stewardship and ESG 
involves different skill sets than financial literacy.  Even if investors do not 
understand compound interest, they can identify and express their preferences 
with respect to policy issues like corporate political spending, executive 
compensation and climate change.  The problem is that, even if investors’ 
general policy positions is clear, understanding the business ramifications of 
those positions with respect to a particular portfolio company is quite 
complex.105   
 
 Moreover, extrapolating from investors’ general policy positions into a 
workable set of voting guidelines is more difficult than it initially appears.  
Media reports highlight this challenge when they criticize mutual funds for their 
voting records.106  For example, corporations face an increasing number and 
range of ESG-related shareholder proposals, particularly proposals seeking 
reporting or the adoption of formal board policies with respect to various social 
policy concerns, 107 but there are reasons why a shareholder who supports 
diversity may not support a particular diversity proposal.108  Similarly a 
shareholder who opposes food waste or is concerned about climate change might 
nonetheless decide that requiring an issuer report publicly on such issues is not 
cost-justified.  If it is difficult even to figure out what a rational shareholder 
 
Review (reporting that levels of financial literacy among workplace-only investors 
were “strikingly low.”).   
104 Id. 
105 A recent Wall Street Journal article highlights the impact of the “stakeholder 
model” on PG&E.  Allysia Finley, ‘”Stakeholder” Capitalism in Action’ (21 Oct. 
2019) Wall St. J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-in-action-
11571696787 
106 See, e.g., Braham, supra note __. 
107 Shareholders at Amazon’s 2019 annual meeting, for example, introduced 
resolutions seeking the company to disclose “the environmental and social impacts 
of food waste generated from the company’s operations” and to “report on its 
efforts to address hate speech and the sale of offensive products throughout its 
businesses”. 
108 Consider, for example, the Amazon shareholder proposal on “board diversity.” 
(calling the Board to implement a “Rooney Rule” with the “true diversity” 
proposal introduced by some conservative groups calling for greater ideological 
diversity on corporate boards)  Kevin Mooney, ‘Conservative Shareholders Push 
Facebook to Achieve “True Diversity”’ (29 May 2019) The Daily Signal 
https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/05/29/conservative-shareholders-push-
facebook-to-achieve-true-diversity/ 
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would prefer, it is hard to see how the average mutual fund investor could 
develop meaningful policy positions, especially when the impact of his or her 
preferences on the policies of the underlying portfolio companies is likely to be 
quite small.   
 
 A more practical concern with pass-through voting is voter turnout.109  
Ordinary retail investors typically vote than 30% of their shares in corporate 
elections.  Voting participation by retail stockholders in mutual funds is even 
lower, and mutual funds have consistently experienced difficulty in obtaining a 
quorum in their shareholder meetings, even though a quorum may require as few 
as one third of the outstanding shares of the fund.110   Low voter turnout is more 
common among shareholders in passive funds, who tend to “set it and forget 
it.”111 Moreover, because any given mutual fund generally holds hundreds of 
portfolio companies or more, the number of occasions on which mutual fund 
shareholders will be called upon to vote is substantially greater than for ordinary 
retail investors.   
 
 Of course, limited participation need not prevent a mutual fund from 
following the preferences of those beneficiaries who participate actively.  
Because participation is likely to be higher by wealthier investors, however, this 
 
109 Paul Schott Stevens, ‘SEC Should Reject Complex, Costly “Pass-Through” 









hoot.send_dayofweek=Tuesday&hoot.send_hour=20.  Notably, although some 
commentators such as Lund argue that low turnout is unproblematic if it reduces 
the instances of uninformed voting, if particular groups of shareholders are 
systematically underrepresented, it is problematic to view voting results as 
indicative of shareholder preferences.  Lund, supra note _. 
110 Ross Kerber ‘Vanguard asks passive investors to pay attention for proxy vote’ 
(19 Sept. 2017) Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vanguard-
investors/vanguard-asks-passive-investors-to-pay-attention-for-proxy-vote-
idUSKCN1BU2G9  See also Statement of Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO 
Investment Company Institute, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Proxy Voting Roundtable “Broker Proxy Voting” (2007)  
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-537/4537-32.pdf (observing that, in sample of 
mutual fund annual meetings involving a non-routine matter, half required a 
resolicitation because of the failure to obtain quorum). 
111 Kerber, supra note 110.   
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approach cuts against the democratic claims of some pass-through voting 
advocates.  There are also reasons to question whether the preferences of 
wealthy retail shareholders with respect to particular policy issues or more 
generally regarding the trade-off between corporate profit and non-economic 
values mirror those of less sophisticated workplace-only investors.   
 
 Perhaps the most problematic concern about pass-through voting, 
however, is that, to the extent a mutual fund adviser votes in accordance with 
the preferences of its beneficiaries, it loses its power to negotiate with issuers 
for change.112  A key rationale for increased investor stewardship is the prospect 
that, because of their size and voting power, institutional investors have the 
ability to influence the behavior of their portfolio companies.  Indeed, this 
influence can be observed not merely through voting outcomes but by noting the 
number of shareholder resolutions that result in negotiated withdrawals 
following management’s acquiescence or commitment to voluntary action.113  
An institutional investor that relinquishes control over its voting decisions 




 Investor stewardship is a potentially powerful tool for influencing 
corporate behavior.  As a result, it should be handled with care.  Because index 
funds own an increasing percentage of global equity, they face growing scrutiny 
about their stewardship role, and a number of commentators have demanded that 
they do more to influence the decisions made at their portfolio companies.  This 
chapter argues for caution in making such demands.  Index funds offer their 
investors broad diversification at low cost, a model that is in tension with 
demands for high quality firm-specific engagement.  Further, to the extent that 
stewardship encompasses pursuit of broad societal goals or balancing economic 
and non-economic objectives, index funds lack the tools to do so in a way that 
is faithful to the interests of their beneficiaries.  Although these concerns could 
 
112 See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, ‘Index Funds and Corporate Governance: 
Let Shareholders be Shareholders’ (2019) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 (ascribing the ability 
of asset managers to influence portfolio company behavior to the heft associated 
with their voting power). 
113 See, e.g., Paul Rissman & Diana Kearney ‘Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: 
Investment Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (2019) 49 ELR 10171, 
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/elr/featuredarticles/49.10155.pdf  (reporting 
that 45% of shareholder proposals requesting a sustainability report “were 
withdrawn by the filer following an engagement with management that produced a 
commitment to publish, and therefore never came to a vote.”) 
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be addressed by giving index fund shareholders greater voice, it is not clear that 
such reforms would be efficient or cost-effective. 
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